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Formalizability and Knowledge Ascriptions
in Mathematical Practice∗
Eva Müller-Hill
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Germany
Résumé : Nous examinons les conditions de vérité pour des attributions de
savoir dans le cas des connaissances mathématiques. La disposition d’une dé-
monstration formalisable semble être un critère naturel :
(∗) X sait que p est vrai si et seulement si X en principe dispose
d’une démonstration formalisable pour p.
La formalisabilité pourtant ne joue pas un grand rôle dans la pratique mathé-
matique eﬀective. Nous présentons des résultats d’une recherche empirique qui
indiquent que les mathématiciens n’employent pas certaines spéciﬁcations de
(∗) quand ils attribuent du savoir.
De plus, nous montrons que le concept de savoir mathématique qui est à
la base de l’emploi eﬀectif du mot « savoir » de la pratique mathématique est
tout à fait compatible avec certaines intuitions philosophiques mais apparaît
comme différent des concepts philosophiques formant la base de (∗).
Abstract: We investigate the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions for
the case of mathematical knowledge. The availability of a formalizable math-
ematical proof appears to be a natural criterion:
(∗) X knows that p is true iﬀ X has available a formalizable proof
of p.
Yet, formalizability plays no major role in actual mathematical practice. We
present results of an empirical study, which suggest that certain readings of
(∗) are not necessarily employed by mathematicians when ascribing knowledge.
Further, we argue that the concept of mathematical knowledge underlying the
actual use of “to know” in mathematical practice is compatible with certain
philosophical intuitions, but seems to differ from philosophical knowledge con-
ceptions underlying (∗).
∗. We thank the audience at the 17th Novembertagung on the History and Philos-
ophy of Mathematics in Edinburgh and one of the anonymous referees of Philosophia
Scientiae for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 13 (2), 2009, 21–43.
22 Eva Müller-Hill
1 Introduction
In this paper, we will be concerned with the role of formalizability in an epis-
temology of mathematics.
Formalizability is a feature of informal mathematical proofs: A formaliz-
able proof is a proof that can be transformed into a formal proof, that means it
can be transformed into a formal derivation with respect to a formal axiomatic
system with consistent axioms. However, the notion of formalizability is not
a ﬁxed notion like the notion of formal proof. What has still to be speciﬁed
is the meaning of “can be transformed” in this context. We may choose the
semantics of the phrase “formalizable proof” from a spectrum spread between
two extremes. One extreme in the deﬁnition spectrum would be the weak
reading “a proof of p is formalizable iﬀ the informally proven mathematical
theorem is also formally derivable in a consistent formal axiomatic system”;
the other extreme is the strong reading “a proof of p is formalizable iﬀ it can be
translated step by step into a formal proof”, which may refer to, for example,
proofs that are written in some semi-formal language.1
Formalizability is an important feature of mathematical proofs, regarding
foundational issues in the philosophy of mathematics: [Rav 1999, 11] suggested
referring to the thesis that every informal mathematical proof can be trans-
formed into a formal proof as Hilbert’s thesis, as it is linked to the so-called
Hilbert programme.2 We will not be concerned with Hilbert’s thesis generally,
but with an epistemological application of the thesis:
Is formalizability also essential for a philosophical understanding
of mathematical knowledge?
This question is open, and several answers have been proposed. For one,
Rav emphasizes that according to the popular opinion about mathematics
(which he argues against), a mathematician’s job consists more or less in ma-
nipulating formulas to render a decision “true” or “false” about certain theo-
rems. Facing the increasing use of computer tools, such as computer algebra
systems, simulation software or proof checkers, up to the famous examples of
computer proofs (e.g., the proof of the Four Colour Theorem), the question
arises whether mathematicians, in so far as they are working on proofs, might
even be completely replaceable by computers without loss.
1. Note that the transformation relations include the case that a formalizable proof
is already a formal proof. Therefore, all formal proofs are formalizable.
2. In its final version, Hilbert’s programme towards a new foundation of mathemat-
ics was proposed by David Hilbert in 1921. It aims at a formalization of mathematics
and at a proof that the axioms of the formal system that is used are consistent [Zach
2003]. Hilbert’s thesis is actually weaker than Hilbert’s programme itself, which, as
is known, failed as a result of Gödel’s theorems about the completeness and incom-
pleteness of formal systems. Whether Hilbert’s thesis is true or not may strongly
depend on which reading of “can be transformed” is chosen, and therefore, on which
meaning of “formalizable proof” is used.
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Consider taking Hilbert’s thesis as an exhaustive characterization of the
epistemic role of mathematical proof. What eﬀect would this assumption have
on an epistemology of mathematics? As one aspect of this question, we will ex-
amine the epistemological impact of criteria for “X knows that the mathemati-
cal statement p is true” that are based on the availability of formalizable proof.
The paper is also a ﬁrst report on work in progress concerning a socio-
empirical investigation of actual mathematical practice. Besides a purely an-
alytical treatment of the epistemic role of formalizability in mathematics, we
will take into account ﬁrst results of our recently conducted empirical research
on formalizability and knowledge ascriptions in mathematical practice.
2 Preliminaries
A formalizability criterion for “X knows that p is true” is a criterion of the
following form:
(∗) X has available a formalizable proof of p,
where the notion of availability may be weaker than the notion of current
cognitive access.
Our main research question is:
Is there any speciﬁcation of “formalizable” and “available” such
that a formalizability criterion provides an adequate criterion for
the truth of “X knows that the mathematical statement p is true"?
As we will discuss below (Section 3.2), prima facie there seems to be a natural
way to answer ‘yes’ to this question from the philosophical point of view.
However, it turns out that in actual mathematical practice, formalizability
seems to play no major role. Employing the results of an empirical study, we
will suggest that, at least for common readings of (∗), mathematicians do not
necessarily use formalizability criteria when ascribing knowledge. Knowledge
ascriptions in mathematical practice work in a way that diﬀers systematically
from how they should work if they were based on these readings of formal-
izability criteria. This points to the conclusion that, in spite of their prima
facie attractiveness, formalizability criteria may be inadequate for capturing
conceptions of mathematical knowledge as employed in actual mathematical
practice.
We hold the view that for an adequate investigation of the epistemic role
of formalizability, one needs to distinguish between a purely analytical account
of the concept of mathematical knowledge, and an approach towards concep-
tions of knowledge that are actually employed in mathematical practice. Both
should contribute to an adequate philosophical understanding of mathematical
knowledge. In our paper, we will focus on the following aspect of this requested
mutual contribution: The truth conditions of “X knows that the mathematical
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statement p is true” which a philosophical theory of mathematical knowledge
yields should somehow fit, or should at least not systematically contradict, the
meaning of knowledge ascriptions employed in actual mathematical practice.
Our investigation will proceed (iteratively) in three main steps:
- Identify those philosophical conceptions of knowledge that are consistent
with a formalizability criterion—this presupposes an appropriate classi-
ﬁcation of knowledge conceptions, due to the diﬀerent possible speciﬁ-
cations of “formalizable” and “available”.
- Examine and analyze conceptions of mathematical knowledge, especially
the meaning of knowledge ascriptions, employed in actual mathematical
practice. Can they be captured by particular philosophical conceptions
of knowledge?
- Combine the results of both analyses. Are there diﬀerences between
the results of Step 1 and Step 2? Are these diﬀerences due to diﬀerent
aspects of knowledge? Can we develop a conceptual epistemological
framework which is able to cope with these diﬀerent aspects?
The approach is also meant to shed light on the nature and epistemic role
of mathematical proof, which is of great interest for modern philosophy of
mathematics (see for example [Detlefsen 1992]).
The paper will sketch a showcase part of the analysis from Step 1 of our
agenda. We will then turn to Step 2 with two main concerns: On the one
hand, we will present ﬁrst results of our recently conducted empirical study
about the conception of knowledge in mathematical practice. On the other
hand, we will discuss a reasonable embedding of these empirical results into the
overall philosophical framework. This will provide an orientation for further
elaboration of Step 1, and is also necessary for developing Step 3, a long term
goal. While we will give a quite detailed examination of a part of our empirical
results (Step 2), we will not be able to perform an equally detailed discussion
of Step 1 in full generality here.
3 Step 1: Knowledge conceptions behind for-
malizability criteria—a showcase analysis
Mathematical knowledge is alleged to have a special epistemic status. On the
one hand, this is due to the fact that its theorems can be proven, which is
exceptional among the sciences. On the other hand, it is due to the historical
stability of the body of mathematical knowledge, and the high degree of sys-
tematic unity and uniformity even across diﬀerent branches of mathematics.
We stated above that, prima facie, there seems to be an obvious speciﬁca-
tion of an adequate formalizability criterion, as there seems to be a particular
reading of formalizability criteria that can easily account for the exceptional
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epistemic status of mathematical knowledge. In this section, we will ﬁrst
examine this claim by discussing the speciﬁcation of formalizability criteria
involved and the way it accounts for the exceptional epistemic status. We
will then investigate the question whether this speciﬁcation really yields an
adequate semantics for “X knows that the mathematical statement p is true”
in view of Step 2 and Step 3 of our agenda. This question will lead us to the
empirical part of the paper.
3.1 The classical conception of knowledge
Classical epistemology deﬁnes knowledge as justified true belief via the follow-
ing three individually necessary and jointly suﬃcient conditions for “X knows
that p is true”:
- X believes that p is true
- p is true
- X has good reasons to believe that p is true with respect to some ﬁxed
epistemic standards.
This deﬁnition of knowledge has high intuitive appeal. Yet, it has been se-
riously challenged by the famous Gettier examples, and by scepticism.3 The
Gettier examples, as well as the sceptical challenge, are essentially based on
the fact that there is a gap between justiﬁcation and truth. As the classical
conception of knowledge cannot ﬁll this gap for the general case, this con-
ception has to be regarded as inadequate for a general theory of knowledge,
despite its intuitive appeal.
By employing the distinction between internalistic and externalistic con-
ceptions, and the distinction between strict invariantist and context sensitive
conceptions of knowledge, the classical conception of knowledge ﬁnds a sys-
tematical place among the diﬀerent conceptions of knowledge that have been
proposed as a reaction to Gettier and scepticism. We will understand strict
invariantism and context sensitivism as two competing views, concerning the
epistemic standards a subject X must meet in order to know that p is true: A
strict invariantist demands that these epistemic standards are ﬁxed, whereas a
context sensitivist allows the epistemic standards to vary situationally.4 Each
3. The Gettier examples show that in certain cases, justified true belief is not
sufficient for knowledge. Gettier published his examples in 1963 [Gettier 1963]. The
so-called sceptical challenge derives from the possibility of sceptical scenarios like
Descartes’ Evil Demon or Putnam’s brain in a vat scenario [Putnam 1992].
4. Note that when using the term “context sensitivism”, we do not distinguish
between contextualism and a sensitive form of invariantism, namely subject sensitive
invariantism [MacFarlane 2005]. Our main argument in this section hits strict invari-
antist readings of formalizability criteria, and will not be in favor of either sensitive
invariantism or contextualism. We will touch this issue again in Section 5.1 as part
of the outlook on Step 3 of our agenda.
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of these views is compatible with both internalistic and externalistic theories
of knowledge. An internalist claims that X has to meet the relevant epis-
temic standards and has to have (actual) cognitive access to this fact, whereas
an externalist claims that X has to meet the standards objectively, but does
not need to have access to that fact. Accordingly, the classical conception of
knowledge falls into the category of internalistic strict invariantism.
3.2 Internalistic strict invariantism and formaliz-
ability criteria
A criterion for “X knows that p is true” that satisﬁes the following conditions:
(Int) It yields an internalistic and
(Inv) strict invariantist conception of knowledge, and
(T) links epistemic justiﬁcation reliably to truth
apparently characterizes some exceptional epistemic status, following the
line of thought developed in Section 3.1.
The following speciﬁcation of (∗) satisﬁes the conditions (Int) and (Inv),
due to the employed adjustments of the two parameters “available” and “for-
malizable”:
(∗′) X has current cognitive access to a formal proof of p.
Moreover, having access to a formal proof guarantees the existence of a formal
derivation in a consistent axiomatic system, and thus the truth of the derived
theorem relative to the truth of the axioms. In that sense, one might say that
(∗′) exempliﬁes a perfectly reliable relation between truth and justiﬁcation, and
therefore fulﬁlls (T). So, “X has current cognitive access to a formal proof of
p” as a criterion for “X knows that the mathematical statement p is true” may
seem to account for the desired exceptional epistemic status of mathematical
knowledge. But is (∗′) also adequate with regard to our agenda, respecting
both the alleged exceptional nature of mathematical knowledge and actual
mathematical practice?
In a recent paper on a context sensitive account of mathematical knowledge
[Löwe & Müller 2008], Benedikt Löwe and Thomas Müller argue that any
attempt to specify the notion of availability in “X has available a formal proof
of p” as a criterion for knowing that p is true without violating (Inv) or (Int)
either leads to the conclusion that mathematicians actually have nearly zero
non-trivial mathematical knowledge, or leads to counter-intuitive examples
of true knowledge ascriptions. In the ﬁrst case, “available” is understood in
the narrowest sense as current cognitive access, such as in (∗′). Here, Löwe
and Müller argue that facing the empirical fact that a formal derivation of
some non-trivial mathematical statement can easily take up to thousands of
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logical steps, current cognitive access to formal proofs of theorems of higher
mathematics is not a realistic option for a working mathematician. In the
second case, the reading of “available” is severely weakened. As a paradigmatic
example, Löwe and Müller discuss the possibility of introducing a certain time
frame to distinguish availability from actual possession. We may formulate
the corresponding speciﬁcation of (∗) as follows:
(∗′′) Within a time period of length t, X will have current cog-
nitive access to a formal proof of p.
Here, their objections are based on more philosophical grounds: If we take (∗′′)
as a criterion for knowing that p is true, which amount of time is reasonable,
regarding the enormous complexity of formal proofs of the theorems of higher
mathematics?
Following the argumentation of Löwe and Müller, and somehow in antici-
pation of Step 2 and 3 for the particular case, (∗′) (and (∗′′) as well) should
thus be rejected as candidates for an adequate criterion for “X knows that p
is true” in the spirit of our agenda.
Still, there may be other speciﬁcations of (∗) that satisfy (Inv), (Int), and
(T), and there may also be diﬀerent ways to account for the exceptional epis-
temic status of mathematical knowledge instead of an analysis via (Inv), (Int)
and (T). A question of special interest in this context is whether a strictly
invariantist and at the same time internalist reading of formalizability criteria
could be adequate for the purpose at hand at all, or whether an externalist
reading could be better suited. Yet, we will have to leave this as an open
question for now, as it is a question of a much more general kind than ques-
tioning the adequateness of special readings of formalizability criteria which
we discuss in the scope of this paper. Anyway, abstracting from the special
case discussed in [Löwe & Müller 2008], we may state as a conjecture that an
adequate reading of (∗) that strictly fulﬁlls (Inv) and (T) cannot fulﬁll (Int),
as it is hard to imagine how “available” could be appropriately speciﬁed under
any strong (due to (T)), invariantist reading of “formalizable”.
For the purpose of this paper, we will postpone further philosophical anal-
ysis of possible readings of (∗) to Section 5, and will now turn to ﬁrst results
of a socio-empirical study on the conditions for ascribing knowledge in mathe-
matical practice. The results already point to the conclusion that a particular
family of possible readings of (∗) is incompatible with conceptions of knowl-
edge that appear to be employed in actual mathematical practice. On the
other hand, the results also suggest an alternative way of specifying (∗) that
appears to be a promising candidate for Step 3 of our agenda.
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4 Step 2: A socio-empirical study on the
meaning of knowledge ascriptions in math-
ematical practice
How can we investigate the meaning of knowledge ascriptions employed in
actual mathematical practice? Emphasizing the fact that the mathematical
community is, like any other scientiﬁc community, ﬁrst and foremost a social
collective, we make the following explicit assumptions regarding our approach:
- An important part of the meaning (including truth-conditional seman-
tics) of knowledge ascriptions in mathematical practice is determined by
the actual use of knowledge ascriptions among working mathematicians.
- A working mathematician aﬃrms a knowledge ascription if and only if
she takes it to be true.5
If we are interested in the meaning of knowledge ascriptions in mathematical
practice, we should thus shift our attention to how mathematicians use knowl-
edge ascriptions in practice. We should investigate the conditions under which
working mathematicians use sentences of the form “X knows that p is true”.6
This shift of attention provides a natural starting point for an empirical
investigation of mathematical practice, particularly by means of empirical so-
ciology. While it might not be reasonable to investigate empirically whether
some particular knowledge ascription is actually true or not, the use of knowl-
edge ascriptions seems to be a natural domain for empirical research on math-
ematical practice. In focussing on the latter, we regard knowledge ascriptions
as actions that can be more or less appropriate relative to the mathematical
community. Some ascriber Y acts in a certain way by saying “X knows that the
mathematical statement p is true” [Kompa 2001, 16–17]. Whether an action
counts as appropriate (or justiﬁed) in a certain community is determined by
social mechanisms rather than by explicit verbal rules. Tools for an empirical
investigation of social actions and social mechanisms are provided by sociol-
ogy in the form of quantitative and qualitative research techniques. Under the
methodological assumption that mathematicians ascribe knowledge systemat-
ically, the results of a socio-empirical investigation of knowledge ascriptions in
5. The “only if” part of this assumption may be seen as a version of one of the
Gricean conversational maximes: “Do not say what you believe to be false”, falling
under the category of Quality of his cooperative principle of conversation [Grice 1975].
The “if” part may not be valid in general, but reduces to a plausible methodological
premise in the setting of our empirical research project, a questionnaire study.
6. Referring to the well-known semantics-pragmatics distinction, our first assump-
tion emphasizes that this shift does not imply a restriction to “pure pragmatics” of
knowledge ascriptions, leaving the semantics as an autonomous constituent of their
meaning aside. At least truth-conditional semantics is not taken to be autonomous
with respect to pragmatics in general, e.g. [Carston 1991, 47–48].
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mathematical practice will point to certain standards for knowledge ascriptions
that are taken to be appropriate by mathematicians.
In what follows, we will present a mainly quantitative web-based survey
on standards for knowledge ascriptions in actual mathematical practice. Re-
calling that our overall interest is in the role of available formalizable proof for
mathematical knowledge, we have restricted the range of situational, concrete
case studies to knowledge ascriptions based on claimed proof.7
4.1 What is out there?
Many authors emphasize the role of sociological considerations for an epis-
temology of mathematics, for instance the later Wittgenstein, Philip Kitcher
[Kitcher 1984], Paul Ernest [Ernest 1998], or David Bloor [Bloor 1996, 2004].
Yet, there has hardly been done any socio-empirical research about actual
mathematical research practice: The ﬁrst socio-empirical study published was
Bettina Heintz’s work about the culture and practice of mathematics as a sci-
entiﬁc discipline [Heintz 2000]. In her study, Heintz used qualitative methods.
Her work is based on a detailed ﬁeld study (at the Max-Planck-Institute for
Mathematics in Bonn, Germany) and a series of qualitative interviews with
mathematicians.8
In our survey on the conditions for knowledge ascriptions in mathematical
practice, we employed mainly quantitative methods. We used an online ques-
tionnaire which contained mostly multiple choice questions, and some space
for free-text comments. The survey was announced together with a link to
the online questionnaire via postings in diﬀerent scientiﬁc newsgroups. It was
opened in August 2006 and closed in October 2006.
7. It is important to note that the restriction to knowledge ascriptions based on
claimed proof does not coincide with a restriction to an internalist epistemology,
neither regarding knowledge nor regarding justification. One might be tempted to
bring this up as an objection, as knowledge ascriptions based on claimed proof seem
to focus too much on the epistemic subject’s argumentative practice [Brendel 1999,
236], entailing that all justifying factors are part of what is actually accessible to the
epistemic subject. However, this depends essentially on the particular specification
of “available” and “formalizable”. As we have already seen, there are a lot more
notions of availability than just the narrow notion of immediate, conscious cogni-
tive access. Another obvious way to incorporate external factors in formalizability
criteria is to exploit the possibility that an epistemic subject may have available a
formalizable proof without having (conscious) cognitive access to the fact that the
proof is formalizable (cf. Section 5.1).
8. In his PhD Thesis, Jörg Markowitsch also refers to results from interviews with
mathematicians [Markowitsch 1997].
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4.2 Methodology and project data
4.2.1 Quantitative vs. qualitative methods
Our study may be seen as a methodological attempt to employ quantitative
methods for a socio-empirical investigation of actual mathematical research
practice, though we do not aim at using all state-of-the-art statistical evalua-
tion tools from empirical sociology. In the ﬁrst place, we try to explore if and
how the empirical results may generally be brought to bear on an epistemology
of mathematics. The use of quantitative methods is due to the assumption that
the way mathematicians think about mathematics and mathematical knowl-
edge is heavily inﬂuenced by individual factors and might even be a matter of
personal style. In contrast, mathematical practice appears to be very homoge-
nous and uniform. It is a well-known phenomenon in sociology that the way
people think about certain issues does not necessarily coincide with how they
act, it may only point into the right direction [Klammer 2005, 220]. By the use
of quantitative methods, we hope to get more signiﬁcant results about the con-
ditions for appropriate knowledge ascriptions on which mathematicians agree.
The qualitative results from the free-text part are supposed to deepen the
hypotheses that were tested in the quantitative part. These results were also
used to develop an interview guideline for a follow-up qualitative interview
study with international research mathematicians.
4.2.2 Target group and adequacy of the sample
A great methodological obstacle for anyone who wants to investigate mathe-
matical practice by surveys is the apparent unwillingness of its protagonists to
participate. To circumvent this obstacle, we used an online questionnaire in
our project which was posted in three scientiﬁc Internet newsgroups, as news-
group readers are supposed to be less averse to surveys. We do not regard
the resulting restriction of the sample as a serious limitation: A signiﬁcant
correlation between the habit of reading newsgroups and a certain attitude
towards formalizable proof does not seem very likely.9
The link to the online questionnaire was posted two times. The ﬁrst post-
ing was a test-run in the newsgroup sci.math. For the second time, the
link was posted in sci.math.research and de.sci.mathematik, with 214 re-
sponses in total.
The target group of our survey consisted of participants with research or
teaching experience in any branch of mathematics. A preliminary personal
data section of the questionnaire served to decide whether a participant be-
longed to the target group or not. A response was considered as valid if the
personal data part and at least one question in one of the three main parts
9. The follow-up interview study mentioned above shall also serve as a control
mechanism in this regard.
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of the questionnaire (cf. Section 4.3) was completed. We received 76 valid
responses from the target group.10 13.2% of these 76 participants received a
B.A. (or an equivalent degree), 19.7% a M.Sc. (or an equivalent degree), and
46.1% a Ph.D. (or an equivalent degree) in mathematics. Most of the valid
responses from the target group came from the United States of America,
Germany, and the Netherlands, from mathematicians with both research and
teaching experiences at university level for at least one year.
What we will present below are the results from the second posting, ex-
clusively based on valid answers from the target group.
4.3 Empirical hypotheses
The questionnaire we used fell into three main parts:
• Part I dealt with the abstract concept of knowledge and proof math-
ematicians develop,
• Part II focussed on knowledge ascriptions “in action”, and
• Part III was on mathematical beauty.
In what follows, we will only consider results from the ﬁrst and the second
part, because the results from Part III do not bear on the hypotheses we want
to discuss within the scope of this paper.
The results from Part I and II were supposed to complement each other.
The questions in Part I also served as control questions for Part II.
The empirical hypotheses that were tested in Part II derive from two
sources. The ﬁrst source is the analysis of the concept of knowledge underlying
formalizability criteria, which means, the results of Step 1. The other source
are experiences from mathematical practice itself. We will discuss three of
these hypotheses here:
(H1) Whether mathematicians ascribe knowledge based on claimed proof de-
pends essentially and systematically on contextual factors.
The claim that in mathematical practice, knowledge ascriptions based
on claimed proof are context sensitive has been made in [Löwe & Müller
2008]. As mentioned in Section 3.2, we believe that this claim might
be true due to an essential incompatibility of an account of the epis-
temic role of mathematical proof that strictly preserves (T) and (Inv),
and an internalist view of epistemic justiﬁcation. Hence, it must not be
reduced to a statement about purely pragmatic features of knowledge
ascriptions. The apparent uniformity of mathematical practice suggests
that the claimed context sensitivity should be systematic, and (there-
fore) accessible by empirical means.
10. In the presentation of the results in Section 4.4, we will give the total count of
valid answers from the target group for each reported multiple choice question.
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(H2) The actual possession of a formal proof by the epistemic subject X is
sufficient for ascribing knowledge to X.
In Section 3.2, it is argued that truth criteria for “X knows that p is
true” which demand the actual possession of a formal proof of p are too
restrictive, because as a consequence nearly no mathematician would
have much more than non-trivial mathematical knowledge. Yet, for any
current philosophical conception of knowledge, the actual possession of
a formal proof of p is sufficient to know that p is true. Therefore, we also
expect to ﬁnd in mathematical practice that the possession of a formal
proof of p is suﬃcient to count as knowing that p is true. Otherwise,
it would appear questionable whether the endeavour of combining the
analytical, philosophical conception of mathematical knowledge with the
concept of knowledge used in mathematical practice might be successful.
(H3) Mathematicians do not necessarily demand a formal proof in order to
ascribe knowledge.
Formal proofs are rarely used in mathematical practice. Based on this,
the authors of [Löwe & Müller 2008] argue that the actual possession
of a formal proof of p is not a reasonable criterion for knowing that p
is true. Accordingly, the standards for knowledge ascriptions actually
used in mathematical practice should not include the constraint that X
must actually possess a formal proof of p in order to know that p is true.
4.4 Selected results
In the following, we will present selected results of Part I and II by giving
an excerpt of the questions together with the corresponding data. As the
questionnaire had 74 questions in total, we will only present those questions
and results that have been signiﬁcant for the interpretation regarding our
hypotheses (H1), (H2) and (H3).
Part I These are two examples of questions participants were asked in the
ﬁrst part of the questionnaire:
“Is mathematical knowledge objective? ”
response frequency count (Σ 74)
yes 82.4% 61
no 17.6% 13
“Please select to which degree you accept the following statement:
‘One can precisely define what a mathematical proof is.’ ”
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response frequency count (Σ 74)
strongly agree 28.4% 21
agree 60.8% 45
disagree 9.5% 7
strongly disagree 1.4% 1
Participants who gave a positive answer to the latter question, either “strongly
agree” or “agree”, were then asked in a free-text question to give a deﬁnition of
“mathematical proof”. We’ll give selected quotes from the answers. The ma-
jority of answers gave a formal deﬁnition of mathematical proof. The quotes
below show some less frequently given answers. Note that the second and
fourth answer still state that the informally proven theorem has to be for-
mally derivable:11
- “Formally: from a given set of deductive rules, and a set of axioms, a sequence
of statements (machine-verifiable in the correctness of application of the rules),
starting with hypothesis and ending with conclusion. Ideally, anyway.”
- “I would defined a proof fundamentally as argument that convinces mathemati-
cians, less fundamentally as an argument that can be formalised and proven
mechanically.”
- “A convincing argument that instills belief that it is possible to construct a
sequence of formal logical steps leading from generally accepted axioms to the
given assertion.”
- “A finite sequence of statements following logically from each other, that begin
with a given set of axioms and have the statement to be proved as a conclu-
sion. In actual mathematical practice, this sequence tends to be shortened and
written in some human language rather than pure symbolic logic, so the only
difficulty that may arise in defining what a ‘real-life’ mathematical proof is,
is to decide what constitutes an acceptable abbreviation of the hypothetical,
full-length logical proof.”
Part II In the second part, people were led through four scenarios. Each
screen of the online questionnaire contained a piece of the story, and at the
end of each screen the participants were repeatedly asked whether they would
ascribe knowledge to the protagonist of the scenario or not. In the following,
we will give excerpts from Scenario 1 and Scenario 3. The ongoing story of
each scenario will be shortly summarized when parts are left out.
In Scenario 1, the protagonist was a PhD student named John:
“Scenario 1
John is a graduate student, and Jane Jones, a world famous expert on
holomorphic functions, is his supervisor. One evening, John is working
on the Jones conjecture and seems to have made a break-through. He
produces scribbled notes on yellow sheets of paper and convinces himself
that these notes constitute a proof of his theorem.”
11. The orthography of all quotations has been corrected, but the grammar has
been left as it was in the original responses.
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Then, participants were asked to answer the following question:
“Does John know that the Jones conjecture is true?”
On the following screens, the story continued, and the question “Does John
know that the Jones conjecture is true?” was repeated several times. In the
ﬁnal part of the story, John and his supervisor jointly prove the Jones Con-
jecture, and publish their proof in a mathematical journal of high reputation:
“Eighteen months later, the editor accepts the paper for publication,
based on a positive referee report.”
At this point of the story, the majority (84.9%) of the participants gave a
positive answer to the question:
“Does John know that the Jones conjecture is true?”
response frequency count (Σ 66)
yes 28.8% 19
almost surely yes 56.1% 37
almost surely no 3.0% 2
no 4.5% 3
can’t tell 7.6% 5
On the next screen, which was the last of Scenario 1, the story ended with:
“After his Ph.D., John continues his mathematical career. Five years
after the paper was published, he listens to a talk on anti-Jones func-
tions. That evening, he discovers that based on these functions, one
can construct a counterexample to the Jones conjecture. He is shocked,
and so is professor Jones.”
Now, 61.3% of the participants gave a positive answer on the question whether
John knows that the Jones conjecture is false:
“Does John know that the Jones conjecture is false?”
response frequency count (Σ 62)
yes 14.5% 9
almost surely yes 46.8% 29
almost surely no 6.5% 4
no 8.1% 5
can’t tell 24.2% 15
On the same screen, the participants were also queried:12
12. Participants were able, though not requested, to switch back and forth between
the different screens.
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“Did John know that the Jones conjecture was true on the morning
before the talk? ”
The result is somehow astonishing, because still, 71% gave a positive answer
to this question:
response frequency count (Σ 62)
yes 24.2% 15
almost surely yes 46.8% 29
almost surely no 4.8% 3
no 14.5% 9
can’t tell 9.7% 6
Note that when answering these last two questions, participants already
had the information that John has discovered a counterexample to the Jones
conjecture.
After ﬁnishing Scenario 1, we asked the participants to give comments on
the scenario in a free-text ﬁeld. These are some selected quotes, emphasizing
diﬀerent factors that inﬂuenced the answers in Scenario 1:
- “How important is the Jones conjecture? How large is the community?”
- “My answers would have been very different with different time frames men-
tioned.”
- “I don’t know John or Bob, so I don’t have a good feel for how rigorously
they work.”
In Scenario 3, the protagonist was a student of mathematics named Tom,
and the setting was an oral examination at the end of the semester:
“Scenario 3:
Tom Jenkins is a student of mathematics and has to pass an oral exam
at the end of the algebra lecture held by his professor Robin Smith.
Tom did some oral exams before, so he is not too nervous, and is
able to pay concentrated attention to the professor’s questions during
the whole exam. At some point of the exam, Smith asks Tom for the
proof of a certain algebraic theorem T1. The proof consists mainly of a
tricky application of the fundamental theorem on homomorphisms and
was conducted in one lecture on the blackboard. Tom is able to give a
rather technical, but absolutely correct step-by-step proof in full detail.”
83.3% of the participants gave a positive answer to the question:
“Does Tom know that T1 is true? ”
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response frequency count (Σ 54)
yes 46.3% 25
almost surely yes 37% 20
almost surely no 1.9% 1
no 1.9% 1
can’t tell 13% 7
In the proceeding story, professor Smith challenges Tom with questions con-
cerning the ideas behind the proof of T1, and further applications of these
ideas. Tom fails at all these questions:
“The exam continues with some questions about definitions, and after
some minutes Smith asks Tom to explain why the general idea of how
to apply the fundamental theorem on homomorphisms in the proof of
the former theorem is also fruitful to prove a second algebraic theorem
T2. Tom completely fails in his answer.”
Still, 83.3% gave a positive answer to the question whether Tom knows that
T1 is true. There is only a slight adjustment from “yes” towards “almost
surely yes”:
“Does Tom know that T1 is true? ”
response frequency count (Σ 54)
yes 40.7% 22
almost surely yes 42.6% 23
almost surely no 3.7% 2
no 1.9% 1
can’t tell 11.1% 6
On the same screen, participants were asked:
“Did Tom know that the first theorem T1 was true before he failed
in answering Professor Smith’s last question correctly?”
Again, there is nearly no quantitative eﬀect on the positive knowledge ascrip-
tions, 83% gave a positive answer. Note the slight adjustment from “almost
surely yes” towards “yes” compared with the answers corresponding to the pre-
ceding screen:
response frequency count (Σ 53)
yes 47.2% 25
almost surely yes 35.8% 19
almost surely no 1.9% 1
no 1.9% 1
can’t tell 13.2% 7
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The story continued:
“Smith asks Tom to formulate the general idea behind the proof of the
first theorem T1. Tom fails in his answer.”
Note that although there is a clear shift from positive to negative answers
(13.2%) to the next question, there is no eﬀect on the results concerning the
qualitative behavior of positive and negative knowledge ascriptions:
“Does Tom know that the first theorem T1 is true? ”
response frequency count (Σ 53)
yes 32.1% 17
almost surely yes 37.7% 20
almost surely no 11.3% 6
no 5.7% 3
can’t tell 13.2% 7
After ﬁnishing Scenario 3, we asked the participants again to give comments
on the scenario in a free-text ﬁeld. These are some selected quotes. The quotes
support the quantitative result that a correct step-by-step proof, at least when
it is given by the epistemic subject, is suﬃcient for knowledge ascriptions or
knowledge claims:13
- “He knows the truth of the theorems, because these are well known and proved
theorems.”
- “Once you are sure that you gave a correct proof of theorem T1, you need not
revise your opinion on the truth of T1.”
- “Tom knew all the time that T1 was true. He could give a complete and correct
proof, after all!”
- “Well you don’t need to understand the idea behind the proof of some theorem
[...] and to some point the idea is not important at all—just as I said before:
symbol processing.”
4.5 Summary and interpretation of the selected
results regarding (H1), (H2) and (H3)
In the following, we will propose some interpretation of the above presented
results.
First of all, there appears to be a certain tension between the results of
Part I and II:
13. Concerning orthography and grammar of questionnaire quotations, cf. Foot-
note 11.
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- In Part I, the majority of the free-text answers to the question on the def-
inition of “mathematical proof” refer to the deﬁnition of formal proof. In
contrast, the quantitative results from Scenario 1 in Part II aﬃrm (H3):
Formal proof is not necessary for knowledge ascriptions in mathematical
practice (cf. below).
- In Part I, 82.4% of the participants answered that mathematical knowl-
edge is objective. In contrast, the free-text comments on the scenarios
in Part II show that the standards for knowledge ascriptions that are
taken to be appropriate seem to depend on less objective factors like
the size of the community, the importance of the proven theorems, or
on time frames.
Regarding the three hypotheses (H1), (H2) and (H3) formulated in Section
4.3 the following can be observed:
(H1) Whether mathematicians ascribe knowledge based on claimed
proof depends essentially and systematically on contextual factors.
The free-text comments in Part II show that whether subjects ascribe
knowledge or not may depend on:
- the size of the community of the corresponding branch of mathematics,
- the number of referees,
- what is at stake,
- how important the proven theorem is,
- the epistemic subject (e.g., working habits),
- time frames.
This suggests a systematic context sensitivity of standards for knowledge as-
criptions, as it seems to be possible to categorize the relevant contextual factors
beyond the actual, concrete context.
The quantitative results from Scenario 1 point to the conclusion that this
sensitivity is not contingent, but rather essential. After the participants had
received the information that John has discovered a counterexample to the
Jones conjecture, they were asked both if he does now know that the Jones
conjecture is false, and if he did know before his discovery that the Jones
conjecture was true. Assuming that the appropriateness of the ascription
“John knows that the Jones conjecture is false” implies the appropriateness
of the ascription “John does not know that the Jones conjecture is true”, the
results suggest that the standards for knowledge ascriptions that are taken to
be appropriate in mathematical practice are not strictly invariant, but may
for example depend on the epistemic standards in play at the context of the
epistemic subject (John in this case):
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- Does John know that the Jones conjecture is false?
61.3% ‘yes’ or ‘almost surely yes’
- Did John know that the Jones conjecture was true on the morning before
the talk?
71% ‘yes’ or ‘almost surely yes’
This answering proﬁle was the most frequently represented one, but is incom-
patible with strictly invariantist standards for knowledge ascriptions – accord-
ing to the latter, the results for “Did John know that the Jones conjecture
was true on the morning before the talk?” should have been a majority of
negative answers. Our interpretation is backed up by the free-text comments
on Scenario 1 given by participants who answered “can’t tell” on the last two
questions of the scenario. The following quotes may serve as paradigmatic
examples here:
- “[...] There is no objective truth, even in mathematics. There is only math-
ematicians who may be convinced one way or another, and a ‘proof’ (or a
‘counterexample’) may be a means to convince some/many/most of them.”
- “I have consistently interpreted the word ‘know’ in a rather narrow sense. Had
I been John, I would have claimed for myself knowledge once I was reasonably
confident that I had inspected every detail of a proof—but I might have been
wrong in believing that I knew. [...]”
Though knowledge ascriptions seem to work quite well in mathematical prac-
tice, participants reﬂecting on the requirements of a theoretical, rather invari-
antist notion of “to know” weren’t able to decide whether to ascribe knowledge
or not in the given scenario anymore.
(H2) The actual possession of a formal proof by the epistemic subject X is
sufficient for ascribing knowledge to X.
The quantitative results as well as the free-text comments from Scenario 3
aﬃrm this hypothesis.
(H3) Mathematicians do not necessarily demand a formal proof in order to
ascribe knowledge.
This hypothesis appears to be aﬃrmed, again by the results from Scenario
1 in Part II: 61.3% of the participants gave a positive answer on the question
whether John knows that the Jones conjecture is false, after they had received
the information that he has discovered the counterexample. 71% also gave a
positive answer to the question whether he still knew that the Jones conjecture
was true before he discovered the counterexample. If a formal proof had been
demanded by these participants, they would have committed themselves rather
consciously to the claim that a formal proof of both the Jones conjecture
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and its negation would be possible, and thus to an apparent contradiction:
Formal derivability of both the Jones conjecture and its negation yields the
inconsistency of the axioms of the formal system that is used, but the notion
of formal proof includes the consistency of the axioms.
The results suggest an even stronger conclusion: For readings of formaliz-
ability criteria that necessarily entail the logical possibility to prove p formally
(with respect to a ﬁxed formal system), the same contradiction holds. So, it
seems that at least these formalizability criteria for knowledge ascriptions are
not necessarily employed by mathematicians.
5 Conclusions
We saw that the eﬀectively employed conditions for knowledge ascriptions in
mathematical practice seem to depend on contextual factors, and even that
formal provability of a mathematical statement p appears to be not necessary
for ascribing knowledge of p. On the other hand, actually available formal
proof seems to be suﬃcient for ascribing mathematical knowledge, and in
spite of the relative use of knowledge ascriptions, there is still an emphasis on
the objectivity of mathematical knowledge and proof in the back of working
mathematicians’ minds. What conclusions can already be drawn from these
observations towards Step 3 of our agenda, and what lessons can be learned
regarding a possible iteration of Step 1 and 2?
5.1 Towards Step 3
The considerations we have undertaken in Section 4.5 point to some general
incompatibility of the empirical results and purely internalistic, strictly in-
variantist readings of formalizability criteria (recall that in Section 3.2, we
have only discussed particular variants of such readings of (∗)). The use of
knowledge ascriptions in mathematical practice seems to depend on both in-
ternal and external contextual factors. Factors related to the epistemic subject,
such as working habits, are internal factors, whereas time frames, size of the
community, number of referees checking a claimed proof, or importance of the
proven theorem are external factors. Therefore, a speciﬁcation of (∗) that can
still account for our empirical results should allow for some weaker standards
for knowledge ascriptions than strict invariantist standards, and it should also
be capable of incorporating external factors.
We would like to remind the reader of our conjecture about formalizability
criteria fulﬁlling (T), (Inv), and (Int), stated in Section 3.2. Employing the
terminology used in that section, an incorporation of the external factors may
yield a relative notion of formalizability (i.e., a weakening of (T)), and a quite
externalist understanding of “having available a formalizable proof” (i.e., a
weakening of (Int)) in turn: Whether a given proof is formalizable could be
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speciﬁed relative to time frames involved, size of the community, number of
referees checking the proof, or importance of the proven theorem. Hence, an
epistemic subject X could have available a formalizable proof without having
cognitive access to that fact. Factors related to the epistemic subject X, like
working habits, or maybe certain mathematical skills, can be modeled by an
appropriate speciﬁcation of “available”. Depending on the particular role and
signiﬁcance of these contextual factors (which has to be investigated further),
their incorporation may also have a weakening of (Inv) as a result.14 As
mentioned in the interpretation of the empirical results regarding (H1) (cf.
Section 4.5), shifts of X’s context seem to be more relevant than shifts in the
ascriber’s context concerning the epistemic standards for knowledge ascriptions
in this regard.15
Therefore, what we end up with in some kind of ﬁrst order approximation
is that an externalistic, subject sensitive reading of (∗) might indeed be better
suited than the traditional, internalistic strict invariantist readings discussed
in Section 3.2.
5.2 Outlook—starting points for an iteration of Step
1 and 2
Regarding Step 1, the next iteration of our three-step research programme will
thus be devoted to a theoretical discussion of possible candidates for an exter-
nalistic, subject sensitive reading of (∗). As a starting point, we will investigate
Azzouni’s derivation indicator view of proof developed in [Azzouni 2004], and
Manin’s notion of degrees of proofness [Manin 1977, 1981] as candidates for
the respective speciﬁcation of “formalizable proof”.
Regarding Step 2, it should then be investigated whether and how these
candidates for readings of (∗) ﬁt our empirical results. To this end, some of
these results have to be reﬁned in additional empirical studies. For example,
the tension between the empirical results concerning mathematicians’ abstract
concepts of mathematical knowledge and proof, and the empirical results con-
cerning knowledge ascriptions in mathematical practice, has to be investigated
further. Are the conceptions of knowledge and proof used in mathematical
practice inconsistent, or is the tension between the results due to diﬀerent,
but compatible, aspects? Two other issues for further empirical investigation
are to clarify the role of contextual factors for the epistemic standards em-
ployed in mathematical practice, and the role of diﬀerent factors determining
14. Note that even if the context dependency of epistemic standards might turn
out to be an empirical phenomenon of knowledge ascriptions in general, the crucial
point would be that mathematics is no exception.
15. A general epistemology that could account for these empirical results might
thus be subject sensitive invariantism rather than contextualism in the narrow sense
[MacFarlane 2005, 198–199]. Cf. also Footnote 4.
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a possible relative notion of formalizability. Are there other or additional fac-
tors than those mentioned by the participants of our ﬁrst study? Part of these
questions are being pursued empirically in our ongoing qualitative interview
study mentioned in Section 4.2.1.
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